Isolated
One tenant per card for the whole rental. Your sandbox is scoped to the cards you rented, and neighbours cannot see in.
Hardware-isolated by default
Security for shared
GPU compute.
Your job runs alone on the card. The person who owns the machine cannot open a shell into it, and everything you wrote to disk is destroyed when the rental ends.
1 tenant
per card, whole rental
no shell
for the host machine
destroyed
container at teardown
append-only
audit ledger
Start from the worry
Four questions, before any of the mechanisms matter
Everything below answers one of these, ordered by what you came here afraid of rather than how we build it.
Nobody shares a GPU with you
A card is allocated to one rental at a time: no time-slicing, no MIG partition shared with a stranger.
- Single-tenant GPU for the whole rental
- Workload runs in a sandbox, scoped to the cards you rented
- No time-slicing, and no partition shared with a stranger
- Container and scratch volume destroyed at settle
The layers
What stands between you and the host
Your session sits inside an isolated container on the provider's machine. Launch brings up a fresh one, connect reaches it on your key alone, and stop destroys it with its volume. Pick a step to hold it there.
Launch. The provider's box starts a fresh container for this rental, nothing carried over from anyone before, and scopes exactly one card into it: card1. The other three cards stay outside your container, for other renters.
A diagram of the boundaries, not a live host. The card names and the blocked sshd are what a real rental showed on 2026-08-03. Kracht does not encrypt the provider's disk: the volume is destroyed at stop instead.
02Ciphertext by default
What your data looks like without the key
Between your machine and the box, this is all anyone on the way gets: noise. The key that turns it back into your file is your own SSH key, and its private half never leaves you. Follow one file there and back.
your machine
train.pysample file
# train.py
import torch
model = load("support-model-v3")
data = open("tickets-2026-q3.jsonl")
for batch in data:
model.step(batch)your SSH key, private half
SHA256:q7Wm2cR9…tXk4sample
Never shown, never sent. It stays on this machine.
Plain. Your file, as you wrote it.
network + Kracht's relay
on the wiressh
Ciphertext. The same bytes, sealed by SSH. The relay forwards what it cannot read.
the box
provider's disk
authorized_keyssample
The public half only. It can check your key; it cannot act as it.
Plain again. On the provider's disk, which Kracht does not encrypt at rest.
on stop
rental volume
volume destroyed
Gone. Stopping the rental destroys its volume.
04Encryption
Encrypted in transit, and at rest
Hover a card to watch its surface resolve into ciphertext. Traffic is encrypted in transit, the database provider encrypts at rest, and every credential is stored as a hash. Customer-managed keys are not available yet, and this page will say so until they are.
In transit
Every byte between you, the control plane and the card moves over TLS, authenticated by a bearer token hashed at rest.
At rest
Stored data is encrypted at rest by our database provider. We do not roll our own cryptography.
Credentials
Agent and account credentials live only as hashes; a leaked row reveals a hash, not a key.
Egress
Outbound network is off by default, so a compromised workload has nowhere to phone home to.
05What holds, every time
Four properties, true for every rental
Not aspirations. Each of these is enforced by the system, not promised by a policy.
Encrypted
TLS on every call, encrypted at rest by the database provider, and every credential stored only as a hash.
Destroyed
The container and its scratch volume are destroyed when the rental ends. Nothing of the workload survives.
Auditable
Every euro and every state change lands in an append-only ledger, exact to six decimals and impossible to quietly rewrite.
06Compliance
Compliance status, clearly labeled
We track the standards enterprises ask about, and label what is complete, in flight, planned, or still under review.
FrameworkStatusWhat that means
SOC 2 Type IINo audit has begun.
ISO 27001Planned, not started.
GDPRNeeds a legal review before any claim is made.
HIPAANeeds a legal review before any claim is made.
CCPANeeds a legal review before any claim is made.
Everyday practices
- Encrypted in transit with TLS, and at rest by the database provider
- Container and scratch volume destroyed at the end of every rental
- Coordinated disclosure program for security researchers
07Proven, dated
What has been exercised.
Every row is a thing that was run against the live stack, with the day it happened and where it is written down. Nothing here is a total or an uptime figure.
A GPU rental ran end to end on the 7900 XT: passthrough scoped to one card, the iGPU left out, failed sessions charged nothing, every hold released.
Money conserved to the microeuro across the first settlements: renter −0.009019, provider +0.007665, platform 15.01%.
Launch, meter and settle against the live stack, then the connect hop: a renter peered with the hub and read files out of the running container.
#37The worker settled a 27-tick rental under real load, and the provider agent survived a reboot and two control-plane redeploys, re-registering each time.
A renter SSHed into a GPU rental on the default image: one card scoped (card1, renderD128), /dev/kfd openable, the provider's own sshd blocked from inside.
#199Snapshot and restore end to end: a rental stopped with a snapshot, and a second rental restored from it served back the file the first one wrote.
#186A fresh Ubuntu 24.04 box provisioned through the documented one-liner installed the agent, built the instance image itself and kept a session off the host's sshd.
#155
Read it, don't trust it
Everything above is a mechanism you can inspect. Everything below is the paper trail.
Knowledge base
Security knowledge base
Every claim on this page, written up and searchable, linking to the section or the policy that proves it.
Product Security
Data Security
Guide
Encryption in transit and at rest
TLS on every call, encrypted at rest by our database provider, credentials stored only as hashes.
Guide
Data teardown and retention
The container and its scratch volume are destroyed at the end of every rental.
Guide
Account data and access control
Row-level security scopes every row to the account that owns it.
App Security
Guide
Authentication and credentials
Bearer tokens authenticate each call, are hashed at rest, and are never echoed back.
Policy
Coordinated disclosure policy
Report in good faith, get a human reply, and credit if you want it.
On request
Vulnerability and incident response
How a report is triaged, and what happens after you send it.
Data Privacy
Legal
Frequently
asked questions
No. There is no SOC 2 report and no ISO certificate today, and readiness work is in progress. That is the honest answer, and a page about security is the worst possible place to give any other kind.
Two sides, one marketplace
Spin up a GPU, or earn from your own
Rent on-demand compute by the second, or list idle hardware and let it pay for itself. Same marketplace, both directions.
No card required
- 85%
- revenue to providers
- Per-second
- billing, live
- EUR
- metered to the microeuro